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A classic example of external benefits is the rescue of the
person or property of strangers In high transaction cost settings. To
illustrate, A sees a flowerpot about to fall on B's (a stranger's) head;
if he shouts, B will be saved. A thus has in his power to confer a
considerable benefit on B. The standard economic reaction to a situa-
tion in which there are substantial potential external benefits and
high transaction costs is to propose legal intervention. In the example
given, this would mean either giving A a right to a reward or punishing
A if he fails to save B. Either method, we show, is costly and may
result in misallocative effects. These objections to using the law to
Internalize the external benefits of rescue would be much less imposing
were it not for altruism, a factor ignored in most discussion of
externalities. Altruism may be an inexpensive substitute for costly
legal methods of internalizing external benefits, though this depends
on the degree of altruisitu, the costs of rescue, and the benefits to
the rescuee. Although the general legal rule is not to reward the
rescuer (nor to impose liability), the law recognizes the fragility of
altruism and entitles the rescuer to a reward in certain instances.
These include rewards to professional rescuers on land (normally a
physician) and to rescuers at sea. In both instances the costs of
rescue are likely to be sufficiently high to discourage rescue unless
the rescuer anticipates compensation.
——W.M. Landes and R. A. PosnerALTRUISM IN LAW ANDECONOMICS
William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner*
The use of economics to understand the legal system has been
growing rapidly. This new field of applied economics is worthwhile
for its own sake in that the legal system is an important part of the
social system. But it is also interesting for its potential feedback
into the analysis of economic problems in other fields. For example,
the analysis of the social costs of crime has led to a change in the
thinking of economists about the monopoly problem.1 And recent work on
private law enforcement appears to have broad implications for the prob-
lem of employee discipline within a firm.2 This paper will examine
another area where the economic analysis of law appears to have implica-
tions for broader economic questions; we shall discuss the economic
analysis of the law of rescue and explore its relevance to a variety of
economic questions not limited to the "law and economics't field.
Economists have discussed altruism——which we will initially define
as any transfer that is not compensated——mainly irt relation to transfers
within the family, and secondarily in relation to gifts to charity.3
Another important area of altruistic activity, however, concerns the
rescue of the person or property of strangers. One reads in the news-
papers about the passerby who jumps into the lake to save a drowning
swimmer——and about the passerby who does nothing to assist the screaming
victim of a criminal assault. The question of how to explain either
kind of conduct from the standpoint of economics is a challenging one.
An examination of the legal regulation of rescue may provide clues to
its answer.—2—
I.
The peril that invites rescue provides a perfect example of
external benefits. A sees a flowerpot about to fall on B's (a stranger's)
head; if he shouts, B will be saved. A thus has it in his power to
confer a considerable benefit on B. However, it is infeasible for A
and B to contract for the rescue because of the lack of time for
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negotiation.
The standard economic reaction to a situation in which there are
substantial potential external benefits and high transaction costs is
to propose legal intervention. In the example put, this would mean
giving A a right to either a public or private (presumably from B) reward
for the service he renders in saving B; or punishing A if he fails to
save B. Either form of intervention, however, is apt to be quite costly.
Where, as in the example given, the rescuer is not engaged in the business
of rescue, the appropriate reward, which from the standpoint of economics
depends on the opportunity costs of A's time and his expected losses
resulting from the dangerousness of the rescue, would be costly to
compute. And if the optimal reward was low (because the rescue entailed
little cost to A), the costs of computation and enforcement of A's legal
claim would exceed the pure reward component, resulting in misallocative
5
effects.
The costs of legal intervention are in one important respect reduced
under a system of liability for nonrescue (as distinct from a reward for
rescue), for damages need to be computed only in cases where the rule of
liability is violated and these occasions may be few if compliance with
the rule is widespread. In contrast, the reward approach would require
compensation in every case in which a rescue was effected. The liability
'approach, however, creates another cost: it operates as a tax on activities—3—
in which a person may be called upon to attempt a rescue, and like any tax
will cause people to substitute away from those activities. This could
result in too few potential rescuers, again leading to excessive safety
precautions by potential rescuees.6
The foregoing objections to using the law to internalize the external
benefits of a rescue would be much less imposing were it not for altruism,
a factor ignored in most discussion of externalities. Altruism may be an
inexpensive substitute for what we have seen are costly legal methods of
internalizing external benefits——though this depends, of course, on the
degree to which altruism will actually motivate rescue.
Becker's analysis of altruistic giving emphasizes wealth disparities
between the donor and donee.7 This emphasis follows from the principle
of diminishing marginal rates of substitution——i.e., the greater the donor's
wealth relative to the donee, the greater the amount the donor is willing
to give up at the margin in exchange for a dollar increase in the donee's
wealth. The rescue setting presents a dramatic, if unexpected, example
of wealth disparities. At the moment when the flowerpot is about to
crash down on B's head, and kill him, A, though he presumably does not
know what B's wealth was before the flowerpot toppled over, does know that
B's expected wealth is now very small and that his own wealth, however
slight, is almost certainly much greater than B's. Moreover, if the cost
to A of effecting the rescue is very small (the cost of a shout), A can
transfer wealth to B at a very low cost to himself. Thus, even though
A presumably values a dollar to himself much more highly than he values a
dollar to B, because they are strangers, the rescue may still be a
"profitable" transaction for A. Suppose that A considers a dollar to be-.4—
wortha dollar in his ownpossessionbut only 1 cent in B's posses-
sion (though if it were not a rescue setting, i.e.,if their wealth were
more equalized, A might value a dollar inB's possession at only .01 cent
instead of 1 cent). Nonetheless, if A can save B's life at a cost
of a dollar, and thereby confer a benefit on B that A can guess is
worth several hundred thousand dollars to B, the transfer will increase
A's utility though he receives no compensation from B or anyone else.
The "leverage"that A obtains by being able to increase B's wealth
very greatly at little cost to himselfis the counterpart to the matching
grantin the conventional charity context, which reduces the cost of
a giftto the donor below the dollar amount received by the donee.
The above analysis fails to explain why A derives utility from
the welfare of a complete stranger. This question has generally beerL
elided in economic discussions of altruism; it is assumed that family
members (say) have interdependent utility functions but the sourceof
the interdependence is not investigated. But once it is observedthat
gifts are by no means limited to family members, the sourceof this
component of the utility function becomes difficult to accept asa
matter of pure assumption.
The biologists have done more work on this question than the
economists. They have shown that altruism may increase the likelihood
of the altruist's genes surviving in the competition among populations.
If insect A saves B from some peril, this means B will be alive to save
A should he find himself in danger. This "reciprocal altruism" mayenhance
the survivorship of the group to which A and B belong relative to that
of some nonaltruistic insect group.8 A closely related concept (call it—5—
"gene survival") comes into play where, say, A in our example dies while
saving B. A and B may share some of the same genes and B's survival may
contribute more to the chances for the survival of their common genetic
endowment than A's (e.g., if A is B's parent and A is no longer capable
of reproducing but B is).9
Reciprocal altruism may explain some, but surely today only a very
small, fraction of rescues of strangers. In small communities, the person
you rescue, even if a stranger, mayindeedbe a potential rescuer. But
in modern urban communities the probability that you are saving someone
who will someday reciprocate will often be very close to zero, if he is
indeed a stranger. To be sure, the "stranger" may be carrying some of
your genes. But this possibility will often be as or more remote than
the possibility that he will someday rescue you. Thus, the likelihood
that the nonaltruist will be "weeded out" in the competition within or
among modern societies is slight.
If we emphasize simply the large discount that the potential rescuer
will apply to a stranger's welfare in deciding how much cost to incur in
rescuing him, the biological analysis of altruism is helpful. But the
analysis seems to imply not only that the discount will be large, but that
normally it will be so large that only a small fraction of cost—justified
(i.e., where the costs to the rescuer are less than the benefits to the
victim) rescues would be attempted.
A possible alternative to the biological approach is to emphasize
the recognition factor in rescues. The fact that most charitable donations
are not anonymous and, indeed, that many donors seem quite avid to obtain
publicity for their gifts (as where a university chair Is named after the
donor) suggests that the desire for publicity or recognition is an—6—
important factor in charitable giving. Rescuers, too, get their names in
the newspapers and this may be the "real" reason why they rescue complete
strangers.
But this analysis may appear merely to push the inquiry back one
step: why do donors, whether of money or services, receive favorable
public recognition? Presumably, this results from a public sense, however
dim, of altruism as an economizing force (i.e., a low—cost method of
internalizing external benefits, compared to legal intervention). Notice
that this analysis does not require that anyone be in fact altruistic
in the sense that he derives utility from making a transfer to a stranger.
Conceivably everyone who makes such a transfer does so not out of altruism
but to obtain a reward which consists of favorable publicity.
The importance attached to the recognition factor is relevant to
shaping public policy toward rescues. If it is deemed a substantial
motivating force in rescues, this would argue against creating liability
for failure to rescue. One effect of liability is that the successful
rescuer will no longer receive as much favorable public attention, because
the public will assume he acted simply out of fear of liability. This
increases the tax effect of the liabiLity approach in discouraging
potential rescuers.
II.
Although the basis for altruistic impulses toward strangers in
peril is obscure, the existence of the impulse is verified by the numerous
instances in which rescues have occurred where neither reciprocal altruism
nor gene survival could provide a plausible motivation. The fragility of
such impulses——a clear implication of the biological analysis——has also
been recognized by the law. Generally the law does not rely on altruism—7—
to internalize external benefits where the costs to the rescuer are great.
For if the rate at which the potential rescuer equates his costs to the
benefits to the person saved is very low (e.g., it takes $100 in benefits
to the person saved to compensate the rescuer for incurring a cost of 1),
it will follow that altruistic rescues are unlikely to occur in cases
where the costs of rescue are large.
Two examples will illustrate the law's recognition of this point.
Although the ordinary rescuer is entitled to no reward, the professional
(normally a physician) is entitled to collect his standard fee from the
person rescued in the high transaction costs setting (e.g., no negotiation
is possible because the victim is unconscious). Not only is the physician's
opportunity cost of time higher than that of the average non—professional
rescuer, but, because of his greater knowledge of medical treatment, he is
expected to spend more time with the rescued person (treating him, as distinct
from simply calling an ambulance). Thus the total costs of rescue to the
physician are apt to be much higher than those borne by the non—professional.
(To some extent, however, the greater benefit normally conferred by the
professional rescuer's more extensive services may offset the added cost.)
The costs of computing the reward, moreover, are relatively slight because
the physician's fees for similar services are readily discoverable.
The second example is rescue at sea. Normally this is undertaken by
commercial operators and (especially in cases where the vessel or itscargo,
rather than just passengers and crew, are salvaged) at substantial cost.
So one is not surprised that a successful rescue at sea entitles the rescuer
to a reward——and that the rescuer's right is most firmly established where
it is property rather than lives that is rescued (as mentioned, the cost of
pure life salvage is normally much less than that of property salvage and
the normally greater value of lives versus property increases the likelihood—8—
of an altruistically motivated rescue of lives).10 An additional factor
is that to the extent rescue is undertaken by firms operating in a competitive
market, and this is usually the case at sea, the costs of altruism to the
rescuer tend to be very great; the firm's very survival may be at stake
because altruism implies the bearing of uncompensated costs that a non—
altruistic competitor would avoid. A closely related point is that altruism
is not a trait with positive survival value in a competitive market. On
the contrary, competition will tend to weed out the altruistic seller,
just as it tends to weed out any other type of high—cost seller.
Given that legal intervention and altruism are substitute methods
of encouraging the internalization of the external benefits of rescues
in emergency situations, the question naturally arises whether studying
the pattern of legal intervention in rescues might provide a clue to
variations over time or across societies in the level of altruism.
We have compiled a list (available on request) of the countries (and single
U.S. state——Vermont) that impose liability for failure to rescue,
by date of first imposition of liability. The task of explaining this
ordering is a formidable one and we are not able to offer more than
conjecture. It may, however, be significant that no law imposing liability
for nonrescue has been found prior to 1867. This may reflect the fact that
in a pre—urban society reciprocal altruism may provide an adequate sub-
stitute for legal coercion to rescue.
Another suggestive feature of our list is the predominance of fascist
and communist states among the early adopters of liability for nonrescue.
Liability for failure to rescue is a form of conscription for social service
which would seem congenial to a state that already regards its citizens'
timeaspublic rather than private, property. It is perhaps not accidental—9—
that the first (and thus far only) U.S. state to impose liability for non—
rescue is Vermont, which has the third highest tax rate (after Alaska and
NewYork)in the U.S.
III.
Thus far we have discussed altruism as a substitute for law in
internalizing external benefits. But why shouldn't it equally be a
substitute for law in internalizing external costs? Indeed, if we do not
need a law to compel rescues, why do we need, for example, a law to compel
drivers to avoid running down pedestrians?
The reason would appear to lie in the significant discount the driver
is likely to attach to the pedestrian's benefits and the high cost of
accident avoidance (e.g., damage to one's car and personal injury, or the
cost of altering one's behavior at an earlier stage, such as driving at
a slower speed, to avoid situations in which an accident is imminent).
To be sure, when these costs are low, even a relatively small degree of
altruism will be sufficient to induce the driver to avoid the accident.
But when these costs are substantial, though not as large as the benefits
to the pedestrian, altruism is unlikely to be an adequate method of
internalizing the pedestrian's losses and hence a liability rule will
be required to generate optimal accident avoidance.
Why, therefore, doesn't society impose liability only when the costs
of avoidance are high (though still less than the victim's benefits) and
rely on altruism alone to deal with low—avoidance—cost accidents? This
approach would be symmetrical to the treatment of compensation in the rescue
setting. However, the principal objections to compensation in the low—cost
rescue case——the cost of computing the reward, the cost of transacting
between the parties, and the possible use of costly legal proceedings to—10—
enforce one's right to a reward——are not present when the question is
whether to impose liability in the low—avoidance—cost accident situation.
Here a liability rule, if effective, will be a relatively costless device
because the accident will be deterred.—11—
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